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        Letters from the Federal Farmer
        Poughkeepsie Country Journal
        November 1787 - January 1788

Issued and circulated in pamphlet form, printing five letters, entitled:

        Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of
        Government Proposed by the Late Convention; and to Several
        Essential and Necessary Alterations to it.  In a Number of
        Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican.

The author of these letters later brought out a pamphlet of An
Additional Number of Letters, thirteen in all, illustrating and
supporting the principles laid down in the first five.  They are not
included in this e-text, but would be a valuable supplement in this
submitter's opinion.

As for the actual name of the author, it remains uncertain to this day,
though many scholars believe that the Federal Farmer was New York
anti-federalist Melancton Smith.  Until recently, the preferred theory
of authorship cited Richard Henry Lee, a Virginia delegate to the
Continental Congress, but this is no longer believed to be correct.

In submitting this piece of history to a thouroughly modern audience, my
intention is not to color it with editorial comment, but instead allow
the reader to judge the validity of the arguments, put forward so long
ago, in light of more than two centuries of subsequent history.
However, as one interested in the subject matter both as pertained to
the contemporary and modern perspectives, I welcome your reactions.

Finally, I must acknowledge a debt of gratitude to the person who made
the original transcription of these letters into electronic format.
Unfortunately he must remain unidentified even more surely than the
author, for he did not leave any indication of his name.  Only minor
changes have been necessary to submit this, and my thanks for this fact
are profound.

                             Mike Goldman
                         [e-mail]

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                                   I

                                                     October 8th, 1787

Dear Sir,

    My letters to you last winter, on the subject of a well balanced
national government for the United States, were the result of a free
enquiry; when I passed from that subject to enquiries relative to our
commerce, revenues, past administration, &c, I anticipated the anxieties
I feel, on carefully examining the plan of government proposed by the
convention.  It appears to be a plan retaining some federal features;
but to be the first important step, and to aim strongly at one
consolidated government of the United States.  It leaves the powers of
government, and the representation of the people, so unnaturally divided
between the general and state governments, that the operations of our
system must be very uncertain.  My uniform federal attachments, and the
interest I have in the protection of property, and a steady execution of
the laws, will convince you, that, if I am under any bias at all, it is
in favor of any general system which shall promise those advantages.
The instability of our laws increases my wishes for firm and steady
government; but then, I can consent to no government, which, in my
opinion, is not calculated equally to preserve the rights of all orders
of men in the community.  My object has been to join with those who have
endeavoured to supply the defects in the forms of our governments by a
steady and proper administration of them.  Though I have long
apprehended that fraudulent debtors, and embarrassed men, on the one
hand, and men, on the other, unfriendly to republican equality, would
produce an uneasiness among the people, and prepare the way, not for
cool and deliberate reforms in the governments, but for changes
calculated to promote the interests of particular orders of men.  Acquit
me, sir, of any agency in the formation of the new system; I shall be
satisfied with seeing, if it shall be adopted with a prudent
administration.  Indeed I am so much convinced of the truth of Pope's
maxim, that "That which is best administered is best," that I am much
inclined to subscribe to it from experience.  I am not disposed to
unreasonably contend about forms.  I know our situation is critical, and
it behoves us to make the best of it.  A federal government of some sort
is necessary.  We have suffered the present to languish; and whether the
confederation was capable or not originally of answering any valuable
purposes, it is now but of little importance.  I will pass by the men,
and states, who have been particularly instrumental in preparing the way
for a change, and perhaps, for governments not very favorable to the
people at large.  A constitution is now presented which we may reject,
or which we may accept with or without amendments, and to which point we
ought to direct our exertions is the question.  To determine this
question with propriety; we must attentively examine the system itself,
and the probable consequences of either step.  This I shall endeavour to
do, so far as I am able, with candor and fairness; and leave you to
decide upon the propriety of my opinions, the weight of my reasons, and
how far my conclusions are well drawn.  Whatever may be the conduct of
others, on the present occasion, I do not mean hastily and positively to
decide on the merits of the constitution proposed.  I shall be open to
conviction and always disposed to adopt that which, all things
considered, shall appear to me to be most for the happiness of the
community.  It must be granted, that if men hastily and blindly adopt a
system of government, they will as hastily and as blindly be led to
alter or abolish it; and changes must ensue, one after another, till the
peaceable and better part of the community will grow weary with changes,
tumults and disorders, and be disposed to accept any government however
despotic, that shall promise stability and firmness.

    The first principal question that occurs, is, Whether, considering
our situation, we ought to precipitate the adoption of the proposed
constitution?  If we remain cool and temperate, we are in no immediate
danger of any commotions; we are in a state of perfect peace, and in no
danger of invasions; the state governments are in the full exercise of
their powers; and our governments answer all present exigencies, except
the regulation of trade, securing credit, in some cases, and providing
for the interest, in some instances, of the public debts; and whether we
adopt a change three or nine months hence, can make but little odds with
the private circumstances of individuals; their happiness and
prosperity, after all, depend principally upon their own exertions.  We
are hardly recovered from a long and distressing war: The farmers,
fishmen, &c, have not fully repaired the waste made by it.  Industry and
frugality are again assuming their proper station.  Private debts are
lessened, and public debts incurred by the war have been, by various
ways, diminished; and the public lands have now become a productive
source for diminishing them much more.  I know uneasy men, who wish very
much to precipitate, do not admit all these facts; but they are facts
well known to all men who are thoroughly informed in the affairs of this
country.  It must, however, be admitted, that our federal system is
defective, and that some of the state governments are not well
administered; but, then, we impute to the defects in our governments
many evils and embarrassments which are most clearly the result of the
late war.  We must allow men to conduct on the present occasion, as on
all similar ones.  They will urge a thousand pretences to answer their
purposes on both sides.  When we want a man to change his condition, we
describe it as wretched, miserable, and despised; and draw a pleasing
picture of that which we would have him assume.  And when we wish the
contrary, we reverse our descriptions.  Whenever a clamor is raised, and
idle men get to work, it is highly necessary to examine facts carefully,
and without unreasonably suspecting men of falshood, to examine, and
enquire attentively, under what impressions they act.  It is too often
the case in political concerns that men state facts not as they are, but
as they wish them to be; and almost every man, by calling to mind past
scenes, will find this to be true.

    Nothing but the passions of ambitious, impatient, or disorderly men,
I conceive, will plunge us into commotions, if time should be taken
fully to examine and consider the system proposed.  Men who feel easy in
their circumstances, and such as are not sanguine in their expectations
relative to the consequences of the proposed change, will remain quiet
under the existing governments.  Many commercial and monied men, who are
uneasy, not without just cause, ought to be respected; and by no means,
unreasonably disappointed in their expectations and hopes; but as to
those who expect employments under the new constitution; as to those
weak and ardent men who always expect to be gainers by revolutions, and
whose lot it generally is to get out of one difficulty into another,
they are very little to be regarded; and as to those who designedly
avail themselves of this weakness and ardor, they are to be despised.
It is natural for men, who wish to hasten the adoption of a measure, to
tell us, now is the crisis--now is the critical moment which must be
seized or all will be lost; and to shut the door against free enquiry,
whenever conscious the thing presented has defects in it, which time and
investigation will probably discover.  This has been the custom of
tyrants, and their dependents in all ages.  If it is true, what has been
so often said, that the people of this country cannot change their
condition for the worse, I presume it still behoves them to endeavour
deliberately to change it for the better.  The fickle and ardent, in any
community are the proper tools for establishing despotic government.
But it is deliberate and thinking men, who must establish and secure
governments on free principles.  Before they decide on the plan
proposed, they will enquire whether it will probably be a blessing or a
curse to this people.

    The present moment discovers a new face in our affairs.  Our object
has been all along, to reform our federal system and to strengthen our
governments--to establish peace, order and justice in the community--
but a new object now presents.  The plan of government now proposed is
evidently calculated totally to change, in time, our condition as a
people.  Instead of being thirteen republics, under a federal head, it
is clearly designed to make us one consolidated government.  Of this, I
think, I shall fully convince you, in my following letters on this
subject.  This consolidation of the states has been the object of
several men in this country for some time past.  Whether such a change
can ever be effected, in any manner; whether it can be effected without
convulsions and civil wars; whether such a change will not totally
destroy the liberties of this country--time only can determine.

    To have a just idea of the government before us, and to show that a
consolidated one is the object in view, it is necessary not only to
examine the plan, but also its history, and the politics of its
particular friends.

    The confederation was formed when great confidence was placed in the
voluntary exertions of individuals, and of the respective states; and
the framers of it, to guard against usurpation, so limited and checked
the powers, that, in many respects, they are inadequate to the
exigencies of the union.  We find, therefore, members of congress urging
alterations in the federal system almost as soon as it was adopted.  It
was early proposed to vest congress with powers to levy an impost, to
regulate trade, &c, but such was known to be the caution of the states
in parting with power, that the vestment even of these, was proposed to
be under several checks and limitations.  During the war, the general
confusion, and the introduction of paper money, infused in the minds of
people vague ideas respecting government and credit.  We expected too
much from the return of peace, and of course we have been disappointed.
Our governments have been new and unsettled; and several legislatures,
by making tender, suspension, and paper money laws, have given just
cause of uneasiness to creditors.  By these and other causes, several
orders of men in the community have been prepared, by degrees, for a
change of government; and this very abuse of power in the legislatures,
which in some cases has been charged upon the democratic part of the
community, has furnished aristocratical men with those very weapons, and
those very means, with which, in great measure, they are rapidly
effecting their favorite object.  And should an oppressive government be
the consequence of the proposed change, posterity may reproach not only
a few overbearing, unprincipled men, but those parties in the states
which have misused their powers.

    The conduct of several legislatures, touching paper money, and
tender laws, has prepared many honest men for changes in government,
which otherwise they would not have thought of--when by the evils, on
the one hand, and by the secret instigations of artful men, on the
other, the minds of men were become sufficiently uneasy, a bold step was
taken, which is usually followed by a revolution, or a civil war.  A
general convention for mere commercial purposes was moved for--the
authors of this measure saw that the people's attention was turned
solely to the amendment of the federal system; and that, had the idea of
a total change been started, probably no state would have appointed
members to the convention.  The idea of destroying ultimately, the state
government, and forming one consolidated system, could not have been
admitted--a convention, therefore, merely for vesting in congress power
to regulate trade was proposed.  This was pleasing to the commercial
towns; and the landed people had little or no concern about it.
September, 1786, a few men from the middle states met at Annapolis, and
hastily proposed a convention to be held in May, 1787, for the purpose,
generally, of amending the confederation--this was done before the
delegates of Massachusetts, and of the other states arrived--still not a
word was said about destroying the old constitution, and making a new
one--The states still unsuspecting, and not aware that they were passing
the Rubicon, appointed members to the new convention, for the sole and
express purpose of revising and amending the confederation--and,
probably, not one man in ten thousand in the United States, till within
these ten or twelve days, had an idea that the old ship was to be
destroyed, and he put to the alternative of embarking in the new ship
presented, or of being left in danger of sinking--The States, I believe,
universally supposed the convention would report alterations in the
confederation, which would pass an examination in congress, and after
being agreed to there, would be confirmed by all the legislatures, or be
rejected.  Virginia made a very respectable appointment, and placed at
the head of it the first man in America.  In this appointment there was
a mixture of political characters; but Pennsylvania appointed
principally those men who are esteemed aristocratical.  Here the
favorite moment for changing the government was evidently discerned by a
few men, who seized it with address.  Ten other states appointed, and
though they chose men principally connected with commerce and the
judicial department yet they appointed many good republican
characters--had they all attended we should now see, I am persuaded, a
better system presented.  The non-attendance of eight or nine men, who
were appointed members of the convention, I shall ever consider as a
very unfortunate event to the United States.--Had they attended, I am
pretty clear, that the result of the convention would not have had that
strong tendency to aristocracy now discernable in every part of the
plan.  There would not have been so great an accumulation of powers,
especially as to the internal police of this country, in a few hands, as
the constitution reported proposes to vest in them--the young visionary
men, and the consolidating aristocracy, would have been more restrained
than they have been.  Eleven states met in the convention, and after
four months close attention presented the new constitution, to be
adopted or rejected by the people. The uneasy and fickle part of the
community may be prepared to receive any form of government; but I
presume the enlightened and substantial part will give any constitution
presented for their adoption a candid and thorough examination; and
silence those designing or empty men, who weakly and rashly attempt to
precipitate the adoption of a system of so much importance--We shall
view the convention with proper respect--and, at the same time, that we
reflect there were men of abilities and integrity in it, we must
recollect how disproportionately the democratic and aristocratic parts
of the community were represented--Perhaps the judicious friends and
opposers of the new constitution will agree, that it is best to let it
rely solely on its own merits, or be condemned for its own defects.

    In the first place, I shall premise, that the plan proposed is a
plan of accommodation--and that it is in this way only, and by giving up
a part of our opinions, that we can ever expect to obtain a government
founded in freedom and compact.  This circumstance candid men will
always keep in view, in the discussion of this subject.

    The plan proposed appears to be partly federal, but principally
however, calculated ultimately to make the states one consolidated
government.

    The first interesting question, therefore suggested, is, how far the
states can be consolidated into one entire government on free
principles.  In considering this question extensive objects are to be
taken into view, and important changes in the forms of government to be
carefully attended to in all their consequences.  The happiness of the
people at large must be the great object with every honest statesman,
and he will direct every movement to this point.  If we are so situated
as a people, as not to be able to enjoy equal happiness and advantages
under one government, the consolidation of the states cannot be
admitted.

    There are three different forms of free government under which the
United States may exist as one nation; and now is, perhaps, the time to
determine to which we will direct our views.  1.  distinct republics
connected under a federal head.  In this case the respective state
governments must be the principal guardians of the peoples rights, and
exclusively regulate their internal police; in them must rest the
balance of government.  The congress of the states, or federal head,
must consist of delegates amenable to, and removable by the respective
states: This congress must have general directing powers; powers to
require men and monies of the states; to make treaties; peace and war;
to direct the operations of armies, &c.  Under this federal modification
of government, the powers of congress would be rather advisory or
recommendatory than coercive.  2.  We may do away the federal state
governments, and form or consolidate all the states into one entire
government, with one executive, one judiciary, and one legislature,
consisting of senators and representatives collected from all parts of
the union: In this case there would be a compleat consolidation of the
states.  3.  We may consolidate the states as to certain national
objects, and leave them severally distinct independent republics, as to
internal police generally.  Let the general government consist of an
executive, a judiciary, and balanced legislature, and its powers extend
exclusively to all foreign concerns, causes arising on the seas to
commerce, imports, armies, navies, Indian affairs, peace and war, and to
a few internal concerns of the community; to the coin, post-offices,
weights and measures, a general plan for the militia, to naturalization,
and, perhaps to bankruptcies, leaving the internal police of the
community, in other respects, exclusively to the state governments; as
the administration of justice in all causes arising internally, the
laying and collecting of internal taxes, and the forming of the militia
according to a general plan prescribed.  In this case there would be a
compleat consolidation, quoad certain objects only.

    Touching the first, or federal plan, I do not think much can be said
in its favor: The sovereignty of the nation, without coercive and
efficient powers to collect the strength of it, cannot always be
depended on to answer the purposes of government; and in a congress of
representatives of foreign states, there must necessarily be an
unreasonable mixture of powers in the same hands.

    As to the second, or compleat consolidating plan, it deserves to be
carefully considered at this time by every American: If it be
impracticable, it is a fatal error to model our governments, directing
our views ultimately to it.

   The third plan, or partial consolidation, is, in my opinion, the only
one that can secure the freedom and happiness of this people.  I once
had some general ideas that the second plan was practicable, but from
long attention, and the proceedings of the convention, I am fully
satisfied, that this third plan is the only one we can with safety and
propriety proceed upon.  Making this the standard to point out, with
candor and fairness, the parts of the new constitution which appear to
be improper, is my object.  The convention appears to have proposed the
partial consolidation evidently with a view to collect all powers
ultimately, in the United States into one entire government; and from
its views in this respect, and from the tenacity of the small states to
have an equal vote in the senate, probably originated the greatest
defects in the proposed plan.

    Independent of the opinions of many great authors, that a free
elective government cannot be extended over large territories, a few
reflections must evince, that one government and general legislation
alone never can extend equal benefits to all parts of the United States:
Different laws, customs, and opinions exist in the different states,
which by a uniform system of laws would be unreasonably invaded.  The
United States contain about a million of square miles, and in half a
century will, probably, contain ten millions of people; and from the
center to the extremes is about 800 miles.

    Before we do away the state governments or adopt measures that will
tend to abolish them, and to consolidate the states into one entire
government several principles should be considered and facts
ascertained:--These, and my examination into the essential parts of the
proposed plan, I shall pursue in my next.

Your's, &c,
THE FEDERAL FARMER.

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                                  II

                                                     October 9th, 1787

Dear Sir,

    The essential parts of a free and good government are a full and
equal representation of the people in the legislature, and the jury
trial of the vicinage in the administration of justice--a full and equal
representation, is that which possesses the same interests, feelings,
opinions, and views the people themselves would were they all
assembled--a fair representation, therefore, should be so regulated,
that every order of men in the community, according to the common course
of elections, can have a share in it--in order to allow professional
men, merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, &c, to bring a just
proportion of their best informed men respectively into the legislature,
the representation must be considerably numerous--We have about 200
state senators in the United States, and a less number than that of
federal representatives cannot, clearly, be a full representation of
this people, in the affairs of internal taxation and police, were there
but one legislature for the whole union.  The representation cannot be
equal, or the situation of the people proper for one government only--
if the extreme parts of the society cannot be represented as fully as
the central--It is apparently impracticable that this should be the case
in this extensive country--it would be impossible to collect a
representation of the parts of the country five, six, and seven hundred
miles from the seat of government.

    Under one general government alone, there could be but one
judiciary, one supreme and a proper number of inferior courts.  I think
it would be totally impracticable in this case to preserve a due
administration of justice, and the real benefits of the jury trial of
the vicinage--there are now supreme courts in each state in the union,
and a great number of county and other courts subordinate to each
supreme court--most of these supreme and inferior courts are itinerant,
and hold their sessions in different parts every year of their
respective states, counties and districts--with all these moving courts,
our citizens, from the vast extent of the country, must travel very
considerable distances from home to find the place where justice is
administered.  I am not for bringing justice so near to individuals as
to afford them any temptation to engage in law suits; though I think it
one of the greatest benefits in a good government, that each citizen
should find a court of justice within a reasonable distance, perhaps,
within a day's travel of his home; so that, without great inconveniences
and enormous expence, he may have the advantages of his witnesses and
jury--it would be impracticable to derive these advantages from one
judiciary--the one supreme court at most could only set in the center of
the union, and move once a year into the center of the eastern and
southern extremes of it--and, in this case, each citizen, on an average,
would travel 150 or 200 miles to find this court--that, however,
inferior courts might be properly placed in the different counties, and
districts of the union, the appellate jurisdiction would be intolerable
and expensive.

    If it were possible to consolidate the states, and preserve the
features of a free government, still it is evident that the middle
states, the parts of the union, about the seat of government, would
enjoy great advantages, while the remote states would experience the
many inconveniences of remote provinces.  Wealth, offices, and the
benefits of government would collect in the center: and the extreme
states; and their principal towns, become much less important.

    There are other considerations which tend to prove that the idea of
one consolidated whole, on free principles, is ill-founded--the laws of
a free government rest on the confidence of the people, and operate
gently--and never can extend the influence very far--if they are
executed on free principles, about the center, where the benefits of the
government induce the people to support it voluntarily; yet they must be
executed on the principles of fear and force in the extremes--This has
been the case with every extensive republic of which we have any
accurate account.

    There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights, which in
forming the social compact, ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed
--a free and enlightened people, in forming this compact, will not
resign all their rights to those who govern, and they will fix limits to
their legislators and rulers, which will soon be plainly seen by those
who are governed, as well as by those who govern: and the latter will
know they cannot be passed unperceived by the former, and without giving
a general alarm--These rights should be made the basis of every
constitution; and if a people be so situated, or have such different
opinions that they cannot agree in ascertaining and fixing them, it is a
very strong argument against their attempting to form one entire
society, to live under one system of laws only.--I confess, I never
thought the people of these states differed essentially in these
respects; they having derived all these rights from one common source,
the British systems; and having in the formation of their state
constitutions, discovered that their ideas relative to these rights are
very similar.  However, it is now said that the states differ so
essentially in these respects, and even in the important article of the
trial by jury, that when assembled in convention, they can agree to no
words by which to establish that trial, or by which to ascertain and
establish many other of these rights, as fundamental articles in the
social compact.  If so, we proceed to consolidate the states on no solid
basis whatever.

    But I do not pay much regard to the reasons given for not bottoming
the new constitution on a better bill of rights.  I still believe a
compleat federal bill of rights to be very practicable.  Nevertheless I
acknowledge the proceedings of the convention furnish my mind with many
new and strong reasons, against a compleat consolidation of the states.
They tend to convince me, that it cannot be carried with propriety very
far--that the convention have gone much farther in one respect than they
found it practicable to go in another; that is, they propose to lodge in
the general government very extensive powers--powers nearly, if not
altogether, compleat and unlimited, over the purse and the sword. But,
in its organization, they furnish the strongest proof that the proper
limbs, or parts of a government, to support and execute those powers on
proper principles (or in which they can be safely lodged) cannot be
formed.  These powers must be lodged somewhere in every society; but
then they should be lodged where the strength and guardians of the
people are collected.  They can be wielded, or safely used, in a free
country only by an able executive and judiciary, a respectable senate,
and a secure, full, and equal representation of the people.  I think the
principles I have premised or brought into view, are well founded--I
think they will not be denied by any fair reasoner.  It is in connection
with these, and other solid principles, we are to examine the
constitution.  It is not a few democratic phrases, or a few well formed
features, that will prove its merits; or a few small omissions that will
produce its rejection among men of sense; they will enquire what are the
essential powers in a community, and what are nominal ones; where and
how the essential powers shall be lodged to secure government, and to
secure true liberty.

    In examining the proposed constitution carefully, we must clearly
perceive an unnatural separation of these powers from the substantial
representation of the people.  The state government will exist, with all
their governors, senators, representatives, officers and expences; in
these will be nineteen twentieths of the representatives of the people;
they will have a near connection, and their members an immediate
intercourse with the people; and the probability is, that the state
governments will possess the confidence of the people, and be considered
generally as their immediate guardians.

    The general government will consist of a new species of executive, a
small senate, and a very small house of representatives.  As many
citizens will be more than three hundred miles from the seat of this
government as will be nearer to it, its judges and officers cannot be
very numerous, without making our governments very expensive.  Thus will
stand the state and the general governments, should the constitution be
adopted without any alterations in their organization; but as to powers,
the general government will possess all essential ones, at least on
paper, and those of the states a mere shadow of power.  And therefore,
unless the people shall make some great exertions to restore to the
state governments their powers in matters of internal police; as the
powers to lay and collect, exclusively, internal taxes, to govern the
militia, and to hold the decisions of their own judicial courts upon
their own laws final, the balance cannot possibly continue long; but the
state governments must be annihilated, or continue to exist for no
purpose.

    It is however to be observed, that many of the essential powers
given the national government are not exclusively given; and the general
government may have prudence enough to forbear the exercise of those
which may still be exercised by the respective states.  But this cannot
justify the impropriety of giving powers, the exercise of which prudent
men will not attempt, and imprudent men will, or probably can, exercise
only in a manner destructive of free government.  The general
government, organised as it is, may be adequate to many valuable
objects, and be able to carry its laws into execution on proper
principles in several cases; but I think its warmest friends will not
contend, that it can carry all the powers proposed to be lodged in it
into effect, without calling to its aid a military force, which must
very soon destroy all elective governments in the country, produce
anarchy, or establish despotism.  Though we cannot have now a compleat
idea of what will be the operations of the proposed system, we may,
allowing things to have their common course, have a very tolerable one.
The powers lodged in the general government, if exercised by it, must
intimately effect the internal police of the states, as well as external
concerns; and there is no reason to expect the numerous state
governments, and their connections, will be very friendly to the
execution of federal laws in those internal affairs, which hitherto have
been under their own immediate management.  There is more reason to
believe, that the general government, far removed from the people, and
none of its members elected oftener than once in two years, will be
forgot or neglected, and its laws in many cases disregarded, unless a
multitude of officers and military force be continually kept in view,
and employed to enforce the execution of the laws, and to make the
government feared and respected. No position can be truer than this.
That in this country either neglected laws, or a military execution of
them, must lead to a revolution, and to the destruction of freedom.
Neglected laws must first lead to anarchy and confusion; and a military
execution of laws is only a shorter way to the same point--despotic
government.

Your's, &c,
THE FEDERAL FARMER.

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                                  III

                                                    October 10th, 1787

Dear Sir,

    The great object of a free people must be so to form their
government and laws, and so to administer them, as to create a
confidence in, and respect for the laws; and thereby induce the sensible
and virtuous part of the community to declare in favor of the laws, and
to support them without an expensive military force.  I wish, though I
confess I have not much hope, that this may be the case with the laws of
congress under the new constitution.  I am fully convinced that we must
organise the national government on different principles, and make the
parts of it more efficient, and secure in it more effectually the
different interests in the community; or else leave in the state
governments some powers proposed to be lodged in it--at least till such
an organization shall be found to be practicable.  Not sanguine in my
expectations of a good federal administration, and satisfied, as I am,
of the impracticability of consolidating the states, and at the same
time of preserving the rights of the people at large, I believe we ought
still to leave some of those powers in the state governments, in which
the people, in fact, will still be represented--to define some other
powers proposed to be vested in the general government, more carefully,
and to establish a few principles to secure a proper exercise of the
powers given it.  It is not my object to multiply objections, or to
contend about inconsiderable powers or amendments.  I wish the system
adopted with a few alterations; but those, in my mind, are essential
ones; if adopted without, every good citizen will acquiesce, though I
shall consider the duration of our governments, and the liberties of
this people, very much dependant on the administration of the general
government.  A wise and honest administration, may make the people happy
under any government; but necessity only can justify even our leaving
open avenues to the abuse of power, by wicked, unthinking, or ambitious
men, I will examine, first, the organization of the proposed government,
in order to judge; 2nd, with propriety, what powers are improperly, at
least prematurely lodged in it.  I shall examine, 3rd, the undefined
powers; and 4th, those powers, the exercise of which is not secured on
safe and proper ground.

    First.  As to the organization--the house of representatives, the
democrative branch, as it is called, is to consist of 65 members: that
is, about one representative for fifty thousand inhabitants, to be
chosen biennially--the federal legislature may increase this number to
one for each thirty thousand inhabitants, abating fractional numbers in
each state.--Thirty-three representatives will make a quorum for doing
business, and a majority of those present determine the sense of the
house.--I have no idea that the interests, feelings, and opinions of
three or four millions of people, especially touching internal taxation,
can be collected in such a house.--In the nature of things, nine times
in ten, men of the elevated classes in the community only can be chosen
--Connecticut, for instance, will have five representatives--not one man
in a hundred of those who form the democrative branch in the state
legislature, will, on a fair computation, be one of the five.--The
people of this country, in one sense, may all be democratic; but if we
make the proper distinction between the few men of wealth and abilities,
and consider them, as we ought, as the natural aristocracy of the
country, and the great body of the people,the middle and lower classes,
as the democracy, this federal representative branch will have but very
little democracy in it, even this small representation is not secured on
proper principles.--The branches of the legislature are essential parts
of the fundamental compact, and ought to be so fixed by the people, that
the legislature cannot alter itself by modifying the elections of its
own members.  This, by a part of Art.  1, Sect.  4, the general
legislature may do, it may evidently so regulate elections as to secure
the choice of any particular description of men.--It may make the whole
state one district--make the capital, or any places in the state, the
place or places of election--it may declare that the five men (or
whatever the number may be the state may choose) who shall have the most
votes shall be considered as chosen.--In this case it is easy to
perceive how the people who live scattered in the inland towns will
bestow their votes on different men--and how a few men in a city, in any
order or profession, may unite and place any five men they please
highest among those that may be voted for--and all this may be done
constitutionally, and by those silent operations, which are not
immediately perceived by the people in general.  I know it is urged,
that the general legislature will be disposed to regulate elections on
fair and just principles:--This may be true--good men will generally
govern well with almost any constitution: but why in laying the
foundation of the social system, need we unnecessarily leave a door open
to improper regulations?--This is a very general and unguarded clause,
and many evils may flow from that part which authorises the congress to
regulate elections.--Were it omitted, the regulations of elections would
be solely in the respective states, where the people are substantially
represented; and where the elections ought to be regulated, otherwise to
secure a representation from all parts of the community, in making the
constitutions, we ought to provide for dividing each state into a proper
number of districts, and for confining the electors in each district to
the choice of some men, who shall have a permanent interest and
residence in it; and also for this essential object, that the
representative elected shall have a majority of the votes of those
electors who shall attend and give their votes.

    In considering the practicability of having a full and equal
representation of the people from all parts of the union, not only
distances and different opinions, customs and views, common in extensive
tracts of country, are to be taken into view but many differences
peculiar to Eastern, Middle, and Southern States.  These differences are
not so perceivable among the members of congress, and men of general
information in the states, as among the men who would properly form the
democratic branch.  The Eastern states are very democratic, and composed
chiefly of moderate freeholders; they have but few rich men and no
slaves; the Southern states are composed chiefly of rich planters and
slaves; they have but few moderate freeholders, and the prevailing
influence, in them is generally a dissipated aristocracy: The Middle
states partake partly of the Eastern and partly of the Southern
character.

    Perhaps, nothing could be more disjointed, unwieldly and incompetent
to doing business with harmony and dispatch, than a federal house of
representatives properly numerous for the great objects of taxation, &c,
collected from the federal states; whether such men would ever act in
concert; whether they would not worry along a few years, and then be the
means of separating the parts of the union, is very problematical?--
View this system in whatever form we can, propriety brings us still to
this point, a federal government possessed of general and compleat
powers, as to those national objects which cannot well come under the
cognizance of the internal laws of the respective states, and this
federal government, accordingly, consisting of branches not very
numerous.

    The house of representatives is on the plan of consolidation, but
the senate is entirely on the federal plan; and Delaware will have as
much constitutional influence in the senate,as the largest state in the
union: and in this senate are lodged legislative, executive and judicial
powers: Ten states in this union urge that they are small states, nine
of which were present in the convention.--They were interested in
collecting large powers into the hands of the senate, in which each
state still will have its equal share of power.  I suppose it was
impracticable for the three large states, as they were called, to get
the senate formed on any other principles: But this only proves, that we
cannot form one general government on equal and just principles--and
proves, that we ought not to lodge in it such extensive powers before we
are convinced of the practicability of organising it on just and equal
principles.  The senate will consist of two members from each state,
chosen by the state legislatures, every sixth year.  The clause referred
to, respecting the elections of representatives, empowers the general
legislature to regulate the elections of senators also, "except as to
the places of choosing senators."--There is, therefore, but little more
security in the elections than in those of representatives: Fourteen
senators make a quorum for business, and a majority of the senators
present give the vote of the senate, except in giving judgment upon an
impeachment, or in making treaties, or in expelling a member, when
two-thirds of the senators present must agree--The members of the
legislature are not excluded from being elected to any military offices,
or any civil offices, except those created, or the emoluments of which
shall be increased by themselves: two-thirds of the members present, of
either house, may expel a member at pleasure.  The senate is an
independent branch of the legislature, a court for trying impeachments,
and also a part of the executive, having a negative in the making of all
treaties, and in appointing almost all officers.

    The vice president is not a very important, if not an unnecessary
part of the system--he may be a part of the senate at one period,and act
as the supreme executive magistrate at another--The election of this
officer, as well as of the president of the United States seems to be
properly secured; but when we examine the powers of the president, and
the forms of the executive, we shall perceive that the general
government, in this part, will have a strong tendency to aristocracy, or
the government of the few.  The executive is in fact, the president and
senate in all transactions of any importance; the president is connected
with, or tied to the senate; he may always act with the senate, but
never can effectually counteract its views: The president can appoint no
officer, civil or military, who shall not be agreeable to the senate;
and the presumption is, that the will of so important a body will not be
very easily controlled, and that it will exercise its powers with great
address.

    In the judicial department, powers ever kept distinct in well
balanced governments, are no less improperly blended in the hands of the
same men--in the judges of the supreme court is lodged the law, the
equity and the fact.  It is not necessary to pursue the minute organical
parts of the general government proposed.--There were various interests
in the convention, to be reconciled, especially of large and small
states; of carrying and non-carrying states; and of states more and
states less democratic--vast labor and attention were by the convention
bestowed on the organization of the parts of the constitution offered;
still it is acknowledged there are many things radically wrong in the
essential parts of this constitution--but it is said that these are the
result of our situation: On a full examination of the subject, I believe
it; but what do the laborious inquiries and determination of the
convention prove?  If they prove any thing, they prove that we cannot
consolidate the states on proper principles: The organization of the
government presented proves, that we cannot form a general government in
which all power can be safely lodged; and a little attention to the
parts of the one proposed will make it appear very evident, that all the
powers proposed to be lodged in it, will not be then well deposited,
either for the purposes of government, or the preservation of liberty.
I will suppose no abuse of power in those cases, in which the abuse of
it is not well guarded against--I will suppose the words authorising the
general government to regulate the elections of its own members struck
out of the plan, or free district elections, in each state, amply
secured.--That the small representation provided for shall be as fair
and equal as it is capable of being made--I will suppose the judicial
department regulated on pure principles, by future laws, as far as it
can be by the constitution, and consist with the situation of the
country--still there will be an unreasonable accumulation of powers in
the general government if all be granted, enumerated in the plan
proposed.  The plan does not present a well balanced government: The
senatorial branch of the legislative and the executive are substantially
united, and the president, or the state executive magistrate, may aid
the senatorial interest when weakest, but never can effectually support
the democratic, however it may be opposed;--the excellency, in my mind,
of a well-balanced government is that it consists of distinct branches,
each sufficiently strong and independent to keep its own station, and to
aid either of the other branches which may occasionally want aid.

    The convention found that any but a small house of representatives
would be expensive, and that it would be impracticable to assemble a
large number of representatives.  Not only the determination of the
convention in this case, but the situation of the states, proves the
impracticability of collecting, in any one point, a proper
representation.

    The formation of the senate, and the smallness of the house, being,
therefore, the result of our situation, and the actual state of things,
the evils which may attend the exercise of many powers in this national
government may be considered as without a remedy.

    All officers are impeachable before the senate only--before the men
by whom they are appointed, or who are consenting to the appointment of
these officers.  No judgment of conviction, on an impeachment, can be
given unless two thirds of the senators agree.  Under these
circumstances the right of impeachment, in the house, can be of but
little importance; the house cannot expect often to convict the
offender; and, therefore, probably, will but seldom or never exercise
the right.  In addition to the insecurity and inconveniences attending
this organization before mentioned, it may be observed, that it is
extremely difficult to secure the people against the fatal effects of
corruption and influence.  The power of making any law will be in the
president, eight senators, and seventeen representatives, relative to
the important objects enumerated in the constitution.  Where there is a
small representation a sufficient number to carry any measure, may, with
ease, be influenced by bribes, offices and civilities; they easily form
private juntoes, and outdoor meetings, agree on measures, and carry them
by silent votes.

    Impressed, as I am, with a sense of the difficulties there are in
the way of forming the parts of a federal government on proper
principles, and seeing a government so unsubstantially organised, after
so arduous an attempt has been made, I am led to believe, that powers
ought to be given to it with great care and caution.

    In the second place it is necessary, therefore, to examine the
extent, and the probable operations of some of those extensive powers
proposed to be vested in this government.  These powers, legislative,
executive, and judicial, respect internal as well as external objects.
Those respecting external objects, as all foreign concerns, commerce,
imposts, all causes arising on the seas, peace and war, and Indian
affairs, can be lodged no where else, with any propriety, but in this
government.  Many powers that respect internal objects ought clearly to
be lodged in it; as those to regulate trade between the states, weights
and measures, the coin or current monies, post-offices, naturalization,
&c.  These powers may be exercised without essentially effecting the
internal police of the respective states: But powers to lay and collect
internal taxes, to form the militia, to make bankrupt laws, and to
decide on appeals, questions arising on the internal laws of the
respective states, are of a very serious nature, and carry with them
almost all other powers.  These taken in connection with the others, and
powers to raise armies and build navies, proposed to be lodged in this
government, appear to me to comprehend all the essential powers in this
community, and those which will be left to the states will be of no
great importance.

    A power to lay and collect taxes at discretion, is, in itself, of
very great importance.  By means of taxes, the government may command
the whole or any part of the subject's property.  Taxes may be of
various kinds; but there is a strong distinction between external and
internal taxes.  External taxes are import duties, which are laid on
imported goods; they may usually be collected in a few seaport towns,
and of a few individuals, though ultimately paid by the consumer; a few
officers can collect them, and they can be carried no higher than trade
will bear, or smuggling permit--that in the very nature of commerce,
bounds are set to them.  But internal taxes, as poll and land taxes,
excises, duties on all written instruments, &c, may fix themselves on
every person and species of property in the community; they may be
carried to any lengths, and in proportion as they are extended, numerous
officers must be employed to assess them, and to enforce the collection
of them. In the United Netherlands the general government has compleat
powers, as to external taxation; but as to internal taxes, it makes
requisitions on the provinces.  Internal taxation in this country is
more important, as the country is so very extensive.  As many assessors
and collectors of federal taxes will be above three hundred miles from
the seat of the federal government as will be less.  Besides, to lay and
collect taxes, in this extensive country, must require a great number of
congressional ordinances, immediately operating upon the body of the
people; these must continually interfere with the state laws, and
thereby produce disorder and general dissatisfaction, till the one
system of laws or the other, operating on the same subjects, shall be
abolished.  These ordinances alone, to say nothing of those respecting
the militia, coin, commerce, federal judiciary, &c, &c, will probably
soon defeat the operations of the state laws and governments.

    Should the general government think it politic, as some
administration (if not all) probably will, to look for a support in a
system of influence, the government will take every occasion to multiply
laws, and officers to execute them, considering these as so many
necessary props for its own support.  Should this system of policy be
adopted, taxes more productive than the impost duties will, probably, be
wanted to support the government, and to discharge foreign demands,
without leaving any thing for the domestic creditors.  The internal
sources of taxation then must be called into operation, and internal tax
laws and federal assessors and collectors spread over this immense
country.  All these circumstances considered, is it wise, prudent, or
safe, to vest the powers of laying and collecting internal taxes in the
general government, while imperfectly organised and inadequate; and to
trust to amending it hereafter, and making it adequate to this purpose?
It is not only unsafe but absurd to lodge power in a government before
it is fitted to receive it?  It is confessed that this power and
representation ought to go together.  Why give the power first?  Why
give the power to the few, who, when possessed of it, may have address
enough to prevent the increase of representation?  Why not keep the
power, and, when necessary, amend the constitution, and add to its other
parts this power, and a proper increase of representation at the same
time?  Then men who may want the power will be under strong inducements
to let in the people, by their representatives, into the government, to
hold their due proportion of this power.  If a proper representation be
impracticable, then we shall see this power resting in the states, where
it at present ought to be, and not inconsiderately given up.

    When I recollect how lately congress, conventions, legislatures, and
people contended in the cause of liberty, and carefully weighed the
importance of taxation, I can scarcely believe we are serious in
proposing to vest the powers of laying and collecting internal taxes in
a government so imperfectly organised for such purposes.  Should the
United States be taxed by a house of representatives of two hundred
members, which would be about fifteen members for Connecticut,
twenty-five for Massachusetts, &c, still the middle and lower classes of
people could have no great share, in fact, in taxation.  I am aware it
is said, that the representation proposed by the new constitution is
sufficiently numerous; it may be for many purposes; but to suppose that
this branch is sufficiently numerous to guard the rights of the people
in the administration of the government, in which the purse and sword is
placed, seems to argue that we have forgot what the true meaning of
representation is.  I am sensible also, that it is said that congress
will not attempt to lay and collect internal taxes; that it is necessary
for them to have the power, though it cannot probably be exercised.--I
admit that it is not probable that any prudent congress will attempt to
lay and collect internal taxes, especially direct taxes: but this only
proves, that the power would be improperly lodged in congress, and that
it might be abused by imprudent and designing men.

    I have heard several gentlemen, to get rid of objections to this
part of the constitution, attempt to construe the powers relative to
direct taxes, as those who object to it would have them; as to these, it
is said, that congress will only have power to make requisitions,
leaving it to the states to lay and collect them.  I see but very little
color for this construction, and the attempt only proves that this part
of the plan cannot be defended.  By this plan there can be no doubt, but
that the powers of congress will be compleat as to all kinds of taxes
whatever--Further, as to internal taxes, the state governments will have
concurrent powers with the general government, and both may tax the same
objects in the same year; and the objection that the general government
may suspend a state tax, as a necessary measure for the promoting the
collection of a federal tax, is not without foundation.--As the states
owe large debts, and have large demands upon them individually, there
clearly will be a propriety in leaving in their possession exclusively,
some of the internal sources of taxation, at least until the federal
representation shall be properly increased: The power in the general
government to lay and collect internal taxes, will render its powers
respecting armies, navies and the militia, the more exceptionable.  By
the constitution it is proposed that congress shall have power "to raise
and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be
for a longer term than two years; to provide and maintain a navy; to
provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union;
suppress insurrections, and repel invasions: to provide for organising,
arming, and disciplining the militia;" reserving to the states the right
to appoint the officers, and to train the militia according to the
discipline prescribed by congress; congress will have unlimited power to
raise armies, and to engage officers and men for any number of years;
but a legislative act applying money for their support can have
operation for no longer term than two years, and if a subsequent
congress do not within the two years renew the appropriation, or further
appropriate monies for the use of the army, the army will be left to
take care of itself.  When an army shall once be raised for a number of
years, it is not probable that it will find much difficulty in getting
congress to pass laws for applying monies to its support.  I see so many
men in America fond of a standing army, and especially among those who
probably will have a large share in administering the federal system; it
is very evident to me, that we shall have a large standing army as soon
as the monies to support them can be possibly found.  An army is not a
very agreeable place of employment for the young gentlemen of many
families.  A power to raise armies must be lodged some where; still this
will not justify the lodging this power in a bare majority of so few men
without any checks; or in the government in which the great body of the
people, in the nature of things, will be only nominally represented.  In
the state governments the great body of the people, the yeomanry, &c, of
the country, are represented: It is true they will choose the members of
congress, and may now and then choose a man of their own way of
thinking; but it is not impossible for forty, or thirty thousand people
in this country, one time in ten to find a man who can possess similar
feelings, views, and interests with themselves: Powers to lay and
collect taxes and to raise armies are of the greatest moment; for
carrying them into effect, laws need not be frequently made, and the
yeomanry, &c, of the country ought substantially to have a check upon
the passing of these laws; this check ought to be placed in the
legislatures, or at least, in the few men the common people of the
country, will, probably, have in congress, in the true sense of the
word, "from among themselves." It is true, the yeomanry of the country
possess the lands, the weight of property, possess arms, and are too
strong a body of men to be openly offended--and, therefore, it is urged,
they will take care of themselves, that men who shall govern will not
dare pay any disrespect to their opinions.  It is easily perceived, that
if they have not their proper negative upon passing laws in congress, or
on the passage of laws relative to taxes and armies, they may in twenty
or thirty years be by means imperceptible to them, totally deprived of
that boasted weight and strength: This may be done in a great measure by
congress, if disposed to do it, by modeling the militia, Should one
fifth or one eighth part of the men capable of bearing arms, be made a
select militia, as has been proposed, and those the young and ardent
part of the community, possessed of but little or no property, and all
the others put upon a plan that will render them of no importance, the
former will answer all the purposes of an army, while the latter will be
defenceless.  The state must train the militia in such form and
according to such systems and rules as congress shall prescribe: and the
only actual influence the respective states will have respecting the
militia will be in appointing the officers.  I see no provision made for
calling out the posse comitatus for executing the laws of the union, but
provision is made for congress to call forth the militia for the
execution of them--and the militia in general, or any select part of it,
may be called out under military officers, instead of the sheriff to
enforce an execution of federal laws, in the first instance, and thereby
introduce an entire military execution of the laws.  I know that powers
to raise taxes, to regulate the military strength of the community on
some uniform plan to provide for its defence and internal order, and for
duly executing the laws, must be lodged somewhere; but still we ought
not so to lodge them, as evidently to give one order of men in the
community, undue advantages over others; or commit the many to the
mercy, prudence, and moderation of the few. And so far as it may be
necessary to lodge any of the peculiar powers in the general government,
a more safe exercise of them ought to be secured, by requiring the
consent of two-thirds or three-fourths of congress thereto--until the
federal representation can be increased, so that the democratic members
in congress may stand some tolerable chance of a reasonable negative, in
behalf of the numerous, important, and democratic part of the community.

    I am not sufficiently acquainted with the laws and internal police
of all the states to discern fully, how general bankrupt laws, made by
the union, would affect them, or promote the public good.  I believe the
property of debtors, in the several states, is held responsible for
their debts in modes and forms very different.  If uniform bankrupt laws
can be made without producing real and substantial inconveniences, I
wish them to be made by congress.

    There are some powers proposed to be lodged in the general
government in the judicial department, I think very unnecessarily, I
mean powers respecting questions arising upon the internal laws of the
respective states.  It is proper the federal judiciary should have
powers coextensive with the federal legislature--that is, the power of
deciding finally on the laws of the union.  By Article 3, Section 2.
the powers of the federal judiciary are extended (among other things) to
all cases between a state and citizens of another state--between
citizens of different states--between a state or the citizens thereof,
and foreign states, citizens or subjects.  Actions in all these cases,
except against a state government, are now brought and finally
determined in the law courts of the states respectively and as there are
no words to exclude these courts of their jurisdiction in these cases,
they will have concurrent jurisdiction with the inferior federal courts
in them; and, therefore, if the new constitution be adopted without any
amendment in this respect, all those numerous actions, now brought in
the state courts between our citizens and foreigners, between citizens
of different states, by state governments against foreigners, and by
state governments against citizens of other states, may also be brought
in the federal courts; and an appeal will lay in them from the state
courts or federal inferior courts to the supreme judicial court of the
union.  In almost all these cases, either party may have the trial by
jury in the state courts; except paper money and tender laws, which are
wisely guarded against in the proposed constitution; justice may be
obtained in these courts on reasonable terms; they must be more
competent to proper decisions on the laws of their respective states,
than the federal states can possibly be.  I do not, in any point of
view, see the need of opening a new jurisdiction in these causes--of
opening a new scene of expensive law suits, of suffering foreigners, and
citizens of different states, to drag each other many hundred miles into
the federal courts. It is true, those courts may be so organised by a
wise and prudent legislature, as to make the obtaining of justice in
them tolerably easy; they may in general be organised on the common law
principles of the country: But this benefit is by no means secured by
the constitution. The trial by jury is secured only in those few
criminal cases, to which the federal laws will extend--as crimes
committed on the seas, against the laws of nations, treason and
counterfeiting the federal securities and coin: But even in these cases,
the jury trial of the vicinage is particularly in the large states, a
citizen may be tried for a crime committed in the state, and yet tried
in some states 500 miles from the place where it was committed; but the
jury trial is not secured at all in civil causes.  Though the convention
have not established this trial, it is to be hoped that congress, in
putting the new system into execution, will do it by a legislative act,
in all cases in which it can be done with propriety.  Whether the jury
trial is not excluded the supreme judicial court is an important
question.  By Article 3, Section 2, all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls,and in those cases in which a state
shall be party, the supreme court shall have jurisdiction.  In all the
other cases before mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exception, and under
such regulations as the congress shall make.  By court is understood a
court consisting of judges; and the idea of a jury is excluded.  This
court, or the judges, are to have jurisdiction on appeals, in all the
cases enumerated, as to law and fact; the judges are to decide the law
and try the fact, and the trial of the fact being assigned to the judges
by the constitution, a jury for trying the fact is excluded; however,
under the exceptions and powers to make regulations, congress may,
perhaps, introduce the jury, to try the fact in most necessary cases.

    There can be but one supreme court in which the final jurisdiction
will center in all federal causes--except in cases where appeals by law
shall not be allowed: The judicial powers of the federal courts extend
in law and equity to certain cases: and, therefore, the powers to
determine on the law, in equity, and as to the fact, all will
concentrate in the supreme court:--These powers, which by this
constitution are blended in the same hands, the same judges, are in
Great Britain deposited in different hands--to wit, the decision of the
law in the law judges, the decision in equity in the chancellor, and the
trial of the fact in the jury.  It is a very dangerous thing to vest in
the same judge power to decide on the law, and also general powers in
equity; for if the law restrain him, he is only to step into his shoes
of equity, and give what judgment his reason or opinion may dictate; we
have no precedents in this country as yet, to regulate the divisions in
equity as in Great Britain; equity, therefore, in the supreme court for
many years will be mere discretion.  I confess in the constitution of
this supreme court, as left by the constitution, I do not see a spark of
freedom or a shadow of our own or the British common law.

    This court is to have appellate jurisdiction in all the other cases
before mentioned: Many sensible men suppose that cases before mentioned
respect, as well the criminal cases as the civil ones mentioned
antecedently in the constitution, if so an appeal is allowed in criminal
cases--contrary to the usual sense of law.  How far it may be proper to
admit a foreigner or the citizen of another state to bring actions
against state governments, which have failed in performing so many
promises made during the war is doubtful: How far it may be proper so to
humble a state, as to oblige it to answer to an individual in a court of
law, is worthy of consideration; the states are now subject to no such
actions; and this new jurisdiction will subject the states, and many
defendants to actions, and processes, which were not in the
contemplation of the parties, when the contract was made; all
engagements existing between citizens of different states, citizens and
foreigners, states and foreigners; and states and citizens of other
states were made the parties contemplating the remedies then existing on
the laws of the states--and the new remedy proposed to be given in the
federal courts, can be founded on no principle whatever.

Your's, &c,
THE FEDERAL FARMER.

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                                  IV

                                                    October 12th, 1787

Dear Sir,

    It will not be possible to establish in the federal courts the jury
trial of the vicinage so well as in the state courts.

    Third, there appears to me to be not only a premature deposit of
some important powers in the general government--but many of those
deposited there are undefined, and may be used to good or bad purposes
as honest or designing men shall prevail.  By Article 1, Section 2,
representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several
states, &c.--same art.  sect.  8, the congress shall have powers to lay
and collect taxes, duties, &c, for the common defence and general
welfare, but all duties, imposts and excises, shall be uniform
throughout the United States: By the first recited clause, direct taxes
shall be apportioned on the states.  This seems to favor the idea
suggested by some sensible men and writers that congress, as to direct
taxes, will only have power to make requisitions; but the latter clause,
power to lay and collect taxes, &c, seems clearly to favor the contrary
opinion, and, in my mind, the true one,the congress shall have power to
tax immediately individuals, without the intervention of the state
legislatures, in fact the first clause appears to me only to provide
that each state shall pay a certain portion of the tax, and the latter
to provide that congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, that
is to assess upon, and to collect of the individuals in the state, the
states quota; but these still I consider as undefined powers, because
judicious men understand them differently.

    It is doubtful whether the vice-president is to have any
qualifications; none are mentioned; but he may serve as president, and
it may be inferred, he ought to be qualified therefore as the president;
but the qualifications of the president are required only of the person
to be elected president.  By art.  2, sect.  2, "But the congress may by
law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper
in the president alone, in the courts of jaw, or in the heads of the
departments." Who are inferior officers?  May not a congress disposed to
vest the appointment of all officers in the president, under this
clause, vest the appointment of almost every officer in the president
alone, and destroy the check mentioned in the first part of the clause,
and lodged in the senate.  It is true, this check is badly lodged, but
then some check upon the first magistrate in appointing officers, ought
it appears by the opinion of the convention, and by the general opinion,
to be established in the constitution.  By art.  3, sect.  2, the
supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction as to law and facts with
such exceptions, &c, to what extent is it intended the exceptions shall
be carried--Congress may carry them so far as to annihilate
substantially the appellate jurisdiction, and the clause be rendered of
very little importance.

    4th.  There are certain rights which we have always held sacred in
the United States, and recognised in all our constitutions, and which,
by the adoption of the new constitution in its present form, will be
left unsecured.  By article 6, the proposed constitution, and the laws
of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all
treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
state shall be bound thereby; anything in the constitution or laws of
any state to the contrary notwithstanding.

    It is to be observed that when the people shall adopt the proposed
constitution it will be their last and supreme act; it will be adopted
not by the people of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, &c, but by the people
of the United States; and wherever this constitution, or any part of it,
shall be incompatible with the ancient customs, rights, the laws or the
constitutions heretofore established in the United States, it will
entirely abolish them and do them away: And not only this, but the laws
of the United States which shall be; made in pursuance of the federal
constitution will be also supreme laws, and wherever they shall be
incompatible with those customs, rights, laws or constitutions
heretofore established, they will also entirely abolish them and do them
away.

    By the article before recited, treaties also made under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law: It is not said
that these treaties shall be made in pursuance of the constitution--nor
are there any constitutional bounds set to those who shall make them:
The president and two-thirds of the senate will be empowered to make
treaties indefinitely, and when these treaties shall be made, they will
also abolish all laws and state constitutions incompatible with them.
This power in the president and senate is absolute, and the judges will
be bound to allow full force to whatever rule, article or thing the
president and senate shall establish by treaty, whether it be
practicable to set any bounds to those who make treaties, I am not able
to say; if not, it proves that this power ought to be more safely
lodged.

    The federal constitution, the laws of congress made in pursuance of
the constitution, and all treaties must have full force and effect in
all parts of the United States; and all other laws, rights and
constitutions which stand in their way must yield.  It is proper the
national laws should be supreme, and superior to state or district laws;
but then the national laws ought to yield to unalienable or fundamental
rights--and national laws, made by a few men, should extend only to a
few national objects.  This will not be the case with the laws of
congress: To have any proper idea of their extent, we must carefully
examine the legislative, executive and judicial powers proposed to be
lodged in the general government, and consider them in connection with a
general clause in art.  1, sect.  8, in these words (after enumerating a
number of powers) "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or
in any department or officer thereof."--The powers of this government as
has been observed, extend to internal as well as external objects, and
to those objects to which all others are subordinate; it is almost
impossible to have a just conception of their powers, or of the extent
and number of the laws which may be deemed necessary and proper to carry
them into effect, till we shall come to exercise those powers and make
the laws.  In making laws to carry those powers into effect, it is to be
expected, that a wise and prudent congress will pay respect to the
opinions of a free people, and bottom their laws on those principles
which have been considered as essential and fundamental in the British,
and in our government: But a congress of a different character will not
be bound by the constitution to pay respect to those principles.

    It is said that when people make a constitution, and delegate
powers, that all powers are not delegated by them to those who govern,
is reserved in the people; and that the people, in the present case,
have reserved in themselves, and in their state governments, every right
and power not expressly given by the federal constitution to those who
shall administer the national government.  It is said, on the other
hand, that the people, when they make a constitution, yield all power
not expressly reserved to themselves.  The truth is, in either case, it
is mere matter of opinion, and men usually take either side of the
argument, as will best answer their purposes: But the general
presumption being, that men who govern, will in doubtful cases, construe
laws and constitutions most favorably for increasing their own powers;
all wise and prudent people, in forming constitutions, have drawn the
line, and carefully described the powers parted with and the powers
reserved.  By the state constitutions, certain rights have been reserved
in the people; or rather, they have been recognised and established in
such a manner, that state legislatures are bound to respect them, and to
make no laws infringing upon them.  The state legislatures are obliged
to take notice of the bills of rights of their respective states.  The
bills of rights, and the state constitutions, are fundamental compacts
only between those who govern, and the people of the same state.

    In the year 1788 the people of the United States made a federal
constitution, which is a fundamental compact between them and their
federal rulers; these rulers, in the nature of things, cannot be bound
to take notice of any other compact.  It would be absurd for them, in
making laws, to look over thirteen, fifteen, or twenty state
constitutions, to see what rights are established as fundamental, and
must not be infringed upon, in making laws in the society.  It is true,
they would be bound to do it if the people, in their federal compact,
should refer to the state constitutions, recognise all parts not
inconsistent with the federal constitution, and direct their federal
rulers to take notice of them accordingly; but this is not the case, as
the plan stands proposed at present; and it is absurd, to suppose so
unnatural an idea is intended or implied.  I think my opinion is not
only founded in reason, but I think it is supported by the report of the
convention itself.  If there are a number of rights established by the
state constitutions, and which will remain sacred, and the general
government is bound to take notice of them--it must take notice of one
as well as another; and if unnecessary to recognise or establish one by
the federal constitution, it would be unnecessary to recognise or
establish another by it.  If the federal constitution is to be construed
so far in connection with the state constitution, as to leave the trial
by jury in civil causes, for instance, secured; on the same principles
it would have left the trial by jury in criminal causes, the benefits of
the writ of habeas corpus, &c, secured; they all stand on the same
footing; they are the common rights of Americans, and have been
recognised by the state constitutions: But the convention found it
necessary to recognise or re-establish the benefits of that writ, and
the jury trial in criminal cases.  As to ex post facto laws, the
convention has done the same in one case, and gone further in another,
It is a part of the compact between the people of each state and their
rulers, that no ex post facto laws shall be made.  But the convention,
by Art.  1, Sect.  10, have put a sanction upon this part even of the
state compacts.  In fact, the 9th and 10th Sections in Art.  1, in the
proposed constitution, are no more nor less, than a partial bill of
rights; they establish certain principles as part of the compact upon
which the federal legislators and officers can never infringe.  It is
here wisely stipulated, that the federal legislature shall never pass a
bill of attainder, or ex post facto law; that no tax shall be laid on
articles exported, &c.  The establishing of one right implies the
necessity of establishing another and similar one.

    On the whole, the position appears to me to be undeniable, that this
bill of rights ought to be carried farther, and some other principles
established, as a part of this fundamental compact between the people of
the United States and their federal rulers.

    It is true, we are not disposed to differ much, at present, about
religion; but when we are making a constitution, it is to be hoped, for
ages and millions yet unborn, why not establish the free exercise of
religion, as a part of the national compact.  There are other essential
rights, which we have justly understood to be the rights of freemen; as
freedom from hasty and unreasonable search warrants, warrants not
founded on oath, and not issued with due caution, for searching and
seizing men's papers, property, and persons.  The trials by jury in
civil causes, it is said, varies so much in the several states, that no
words could be found for the uniform establishment of it.  If so, the
federal legislation will not be able to establish it by any general
laws.  I confess I am of opinion it may be established, but not in that
beneficial manner in which we may enjoy it, for the reasons before
mentioned.  When I speak of the jury trial of the vicinage, or the trial
of the fact in the neighborhood, I do not lay so much stress upon the
circumstance of our being tried by our neighbors: in this enlightened
country men may be probably impartially tried by those who do not live
very near them: but the trial of facts in the neighborhood is of great
importance in other respects.  Nothing can be more essential than the
cross examining witnesses, and generally before the triers of the facts
in question.  The common people can establish facts with much more ease
with oral than written evidence; when trials of facts are removed to a
distance from the homes of the parties and witnesses, oral evidence
becomes intolerably expensive, and the parties must depend on written
evidence, which to the common people is expensive and almost useless; it
must be frequently taken ex parte, and but very seldom leads to the
proper discovery of truth.

    The trial by jury is very important in another point of view.  It is
essential in every free country, that common people should have a part
and share of influence, in the judicial as well as in the legislative
department.  To hold open to them the offices of senators, judges, and
offices to fill which an expensive education is required, cannot answer
any valuable purposes for them; they are not in a situation to be
brought forward and to fill those offices; these, and most other offices
of any considerable importance, will be occupied by the few.  The few,
the well born, &c, as Mr.  Adams calls them, in judicial decisions as
well as in legislation, are generally disposed, and very naturally too,
to favor those of their own description.

    The trial by jury in the judicial department, and the collection of
the people by their representatives in the legislature, are those
fortunate inventions which have procured for them, in this country,
their true proportion of influence, and the wisest and most fit means of
protecting themselves in the community.  Their situation, as jurors and
representatives, enables them to acquire information end knowledge in
the affairs and government of the society; and to come forward, in turn,
as the centinels and guardians of each other.  I am very sorry that even
a few of our countrymen should consider jurors and representatives in a
different point of view, as ignorant, troublesome bodies, which ought
not to have any share in the concerns of government.

    I confess I do not see in what cases the congress can, with any
pretence of right, make a law to suppress the freedom of the press;
though I am not clear, that congress is restrained from laying any
duties whatever on printing, and from laying duties particularly heavy
on certain pieces printed, and perhaps congress may require large bonds
for the payment of these duties.  Should the printer say, the freedom of
the press was secured by the constitution of the state in which he
lived, congress might, and perhaps, with great propriety, answer, that
the federal constitution is the only compact existing between them and
the people; in this compact the people have named no others, and
therefore congress, in exercising the powers assigned them, and in
making laws to carry them into execution, are restrained by nothing
beside the federal constitution, any more than a state legislature is
restrained by a compact between the magistrates and people of a county,
city, or town of which the people, in forming the state constitution,
have taken no notice.

    It is not my object to enumerate rights of inconsiderable
importance; but there are others, no doubt, which ought to be
established as a fundamental part of the national system.

    It is worthy of observation, that all treaties are made by foreign
nations with a confederacy of thirteen states--that the western country
is attached to thirteen states--thirteen states have jointly and
severally engaged to pay the public debts.--Should a new government be
formed of nine, ten, eleven, or twelve states, those treaties could not
be considered as binding on the foreign nations who made them.  However,
I believe the probability to be, that if nine states adopt the
constitution, the others will.

    It may also be worthy of our examination, how far the provision for
amending this plan, when it shall be adopted, is of any importance.  No
measures can be taken towards amendments, unless two-thirds of the
congress, or two-thirds of the legislatures of the several states shall
agree.--While power is in the hands of the people, or democratic part of
the community, more especially as at present, it is easy, according to
the general course of human affairs, for the few influential men in the
community, to obtain conventions, alterations in government, and to
persuade the common people that they may change for the better, and to
get from them a part of the power: But when power is once transferred
from the many to the few, all changes become extremely difficult; the
government, is this case, being beneficial to the few, they will be
exceedingly artful and adroit in preventing any measures which may lead
to a change; and nothing will produce it, but great exertions and severe
struggles on the part of the common people.  Every man of reflection
must see, that the change now proposed, is a transfer of power from the
many to the few, and the probability is, the artful and ever active
aristocracy, will prevent all peaceful measures for changes, unless when
they shall discover some favorable moment to increase their own
influence.  I am sensible, thousands of men in the United States, are
disposed to adopt the proposed constitution, though they perceive it to
be essentially defective, under an idea that amendments of it, may be
obtained when necessary.  This is a pernicious idea, it argues a
servility of character totally unfit for the support of free government;
it is very repugnant to that perpetual jealousy respecting liberty, so
absolutely necessary in all free states, spoken of by Mr.  Dickinson.--
However, if our countrymen are so soon changed, and the language of
1774, is become odious to them, it will be in vain to use the language
of freedom, or to attempt to rouse them to free enquiries.  But I shall
never believe this is the case with them, whatever present appearances
may be, till I shall have very strong evidence indeed of it.

Your's, &c,
THE FEDERAL FARMER.

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                                   V

                                                    October 15th, 1787

Dear Sir,

    Thus I have examined the federal constitution as far as a few days
leisure would permit.  It opens to my mind a new scene; instead of
seeing powers cautiously lodged in the hands of numerous legislators,
and many magistrates, we see all important powers collecting in one
center, where a few men will possess them almost at discretion.  And
instead of checks in the formation of the government, to secure the
rights of the people against the usurpations of those they appoint to
govern, we are to understand the equal division of lands among our
people, and the strong arm furnished them by nature and situation, are
to secure them against those usurpations.  If there are advantages in
the equal division of our lands, and the strong and manly habits of our
people, we ought to establish governments calculated to give duration to
them, and not governments which never can work naturally, till that
equality of property, and those free and manly habits shall be
destroyed; these evidently are not the natural basis of the proposed
constitution.  No man of reflection, and skilled in the science of
government, can suppose these will move on harmoniously together for
ages, or even for fifty years.  As to the little circumstances commented
upon, by some writers, with applause--as the age of a representative, of
the president, &c.--they have, in my mind, no weight in the general
tendency of the system.

    There are, however, in my opinion, many good things in the proposed
system.  It is founded on elective principles, and the deposits of
powers in different hands, is essentially right.  The guards against
those evils we have experienced in some states in legislation are
valuable indeed; but the value of every feature in this system is vastly
lessened for the want of that one important feature in a free
government, a representation of the people.  Because we have sometimes
abused democracy, I am not among those men who think a democratic branch
a nuisance; which branch shall be sufficiently numerous to admit some of
the best informed men of each order in the community into the
administration of government.

    While the radical defects in the proposed system are not so soon
discovered, some temptations to each state, and to many classes of men
to adopt it, are very visible.  It uses the democratic language of
several of the state constitutions, particularly that of Massachusetts;
the eastern states will receive advantages so far as the regulation of
trade, by a bare majority, is committed to it: Connecticut and New
Jersey will receive their share of a general impost: The middle states
will receive the advantages surrounding the seat of government; The
southern states will receive protection, and have their negroes
represented in the legislature, and large back countries will soon have
a majority in it.  This system promises a large field of employment to
military gentlemen, and gentlemen of the law; and in case the government
shall be executed without convulsions, it will afford security to
creditors, to the clergy, salary-men and others depending on money
payments.  So far as the system promises justice and reasonable
advantages, in these respects, it ought to be supported by all honest
men; but whenever it promises unequal and improper advantages to any
particular states, or orders of men, it ought to be opposed.

    I have, in the course of these letters observed, that there are many
good things in the proposed constitution, and I have endeavoured to
point out many important defects in it.  I have admitted that we want a
federal system--that we have a system presented, which, with several
alterations may be made a tolerable good one--I have admitted there is a
well founded uneasiness among creditors and mercantile men.  In this
situation of things, you ask me what I think ought to be done?  My
opinion in this case is only the opinion of an individual, and so far
only as it corresponds with the opinions of the honest and substantial
part of the community, is it entitled to consideration.  Though I am
fully satisfied that the state conventions ought most seriously to
direct their exertions to altering and amending the system proposed
before they shall adopt it--yet I have not sufficiently examined the
subject, or formed an opinion, how far it will be practicable for those
conventions to carry their amendments.  As to the idea, that it will be
in vain for those conventions to attempt amendments, it cannot be
admitted; it is impossible to say whether they can or not until the
attempt shall be made; and when it shall be determined, by experience,
that the conventions cannot agree in amendments, it will then be an
important question before the people of the United States, whether they
will adopt or not the system proposed in its present form.  This subject
of consolidating the states is new: and because forty or fifty men have
agreed in a system, to suppose the good sense of this country, an
enlightened nation, must adopt it without examination, and though in a
state of profound peace, without endeavouring to amend those parts they
perceive are defective, dangerous to freedom, and destructive of the
valuable principles of republican government--is truly humiliating.  It
is true there may be danger in delay; but there is danger in adopting
the system in its present form; and I see the danger in either case will
arise principally from the conduct and views of two very unprincipled
parties in the United States--two fires, between which the honest and
substantial people have long found themselves situated.  One party is
composed of little insurgents, men in debt, who want no law, and who
want a share of the property of others; these are called levellers,
Shayites, &c.  The other party is composed of a few, but more dangerous
men, with their servile dependents; these avariciously grasp at all
power and property; you may discover in all the actions of these men, an
evident dislike to free and equal government, and they will go
systematically to work to change, essentially, the forms of government
in this country; these are called aristocrats, m-----ites, &c, &c.
Between these two parties is the weight of the community; the men of
middling property, men not in debt on the one hand, and men, on the
other, content with republican governments, and not aiming at immense
fortunes, offices, and power.  In 1786, the little insurgents, the
levellers, came forth, invaded the rights of others, and attempted to
establish governments according to their wills.  Their movements
evidently gave encouragement to the other party, which, in 1787, has
taken the political field, and with its fashionable dependents, and the
tongue and the pen, is endeavouring to establish in a great haste, a
politer kind of government.  These two parties, which will probably be
opposed or united as it may suit their interests and views, are really
insignificant, compared with the solid, free, and independent part of
the community.  It is not my intention to suggest, that either of these
parties, and the real friends of the proposed constitution, are the same
men.  The fact is, these aristocrats support and hasten the adoption of
the proposed constitution, merely because they think it is a stepping
stone to their favorite object.  I think I am well founded in this idea;
I think the general politics of these men support it, as well as the
common observation among them, That the proffered plan is the best that
can be got at present, it will do for a few years, and lead to something
better.  The sensible and judicious part of the community will carefully
weigh all these circumstances; they will view the late convention as a
respectable body of men--America probably never will see an assembly of
men, of a like number, more respectable.  But the members of the
convention met without knowing the sentiments of one man in ten thousand
in these states respecting the new ground taken.  Their doings are but
the first attempts in the most important scene ever opened.  Though each
individual in the state conventions will not, probably, be so
respectable as each individual in the federal convention, yet as the
state conventions will probably consist of fifteen hundred or two
thousand men of abilities, and versed in the science of government,
collected from all parts of the community and from all orders of men, it
must be acknowledged that the weight of respectability will be in them
--In them will be collected the solid sense and the real political
character of the country, Being revisers of the subject, they will
possess peculiar advantages.  To say that these conventions ought not to
attempt, coolly and deliberately, the revision of the system, or that
they cannot amend it, is very foolish or very assuming.  If these
conventions, after examining the system, adopt it, I shall be perfectly
satisfied, and wish to see men make the administration of the government
an equal blessing to all orders of men.  I believe the great body of our
people to be virtuous and friendly to good government, to the protection
of liberty and property; and it is the duty of all good men, especially
of those who are placed as sentinels to guard their rights--it is their
duty to examine into the prevailing politics of parties, and to disclose
them--while they avoid exciting undue suspicions, to lay facts before
the people, which will enable them to form a proper judgment.  Men who
wish the people of this country to determine for themselves, and
deliberately to fit the government to their situation, must feel some
degree of indignation at those attempts to hurry the adoption of a
system, and to shut the door against examination.  The very attempts
create suspicions, that those who make them have secret views, or see
some defects in the system, which, in the hurry of affairs, they expect
will escape the eye of a free people.

    What can be the views of those gentlemen in Pennsylvania, who
precipitated decisions on this subject?  What can be the views of those
gentlemen in Boston, who countenanced the Printers in shutting up the
press against a fair and free investigation of this important system in
the usual way.  The members of the convention have done their duty--why
should some of them fly to their states--almost forget a propriety of
behavior, and precipitate measures for the adoption of a system of their
own making?  I confess candidly, when I consider these circumstances in
connection with the unguarded parts of the system I have mentioned, I
feel disposed to proceed with very great caution, and to pay more
attention than usual to the conduct of particular characters.  If the
constitution presented be a good one, it will stand the test with a well
informed people: all are agreed that there shall be state conventions to
examine it; and we must believe it will be adopted, unless we suppose it
is a bad one, or that those conventions will make false divisions
respecting it.  I admit improper measures are taken against the adoption
of the system as well for it--all who object to the plan proposed ought
to point out the defects objected to, and to propose those amendments
with which they can accept it, or to propose some other system of
government, that the public mind may be known, and that we may be
brought to agree in some system of government, to strengthen and execute
the present, or to provide a substitute.  I consider the field of
enquiry just opened, and that we are to look to the state conventions
for ultimate decisions on the subject before us; it is not to be
presumed, that they will differ about small amendments, and lose a
system when they shall have made it substantially good; but touching the
essential amendments, it is to be presumed the several conventions will
pursue the most rational measures to agree in and obtain them; and such
defects as they shall discover and not remove, they will probably
notice, keep them in view as the ground work of future amendments, and
in the firm and manly language which every free people ought to use,
will suggest to those who may hereafter administer the government, that
it is their expectation, that the system will be so organised by
legislative acts, and the government so administered, as to render those
defects as little injurious as possible.  Our countrymen are entitled to
an honest and faithful government; to a government of laws and not of
men; and also to one of their choosing--as a citizen of the country, I
wish to see these objects secured, and licentious, assuming, and
overbearing men restrained; if the constitution or social compact be
vague and unguarded, then we depend wholly upon the prudence, wisdom and
moderation of those who manage the affairs of government; or on what,
probably, is equally uncertain and precarious, the success of the people
oppressed by the abuse of government, in receiving it from the hands of
those who abuse it, and placing it in the hands of those who will use it
well.

    In every point of view, therefore, in which I have been able, as
yet, to contemplate this subject, I can discern but one rational mode of
proceeding relative to it: and that is to examine it with freedom and
candor, to have state conventions some months hence, which shall examine
coolly every article, clause, and word in the system proposed, and to
adopt it with such amendments as they shall think fit.  How far the
state conventions ought to pursue the mode prescribed by the federal
convention of adopting or rejecting the plan in toto, I leave it to them
to determine.  Our examination of the subject hitherto has been rather
of a general nature.  The republican characters in the several states,
who wish to make this plan more adequate to security of liberty and
property, and to the duration of the principles of a free government,
will, no doubt, collect their opinions to certain points, and accurately
define those alterations and amendments they wish; if it shall be found
they essentially disagree in them, the conventions will then be able to
determine whether to adopt the plan as it is, or what will be proper to
be done.

    Under these impressions, and keeping in view the improper and
unadvisable lodgment of powers in the general government, organised as
it at present is, touching internal taxes, armies and militia, the
elections of its own members, causes between citizens of different
states, &c, and the want of a more perfect bill of rights, &c, I drop
the subject for the present, and when I shall have leisure to revise and
correct my ideas respecting it, and to collect into points the opinions
of those who wish to make the system more secure and safe, perhaps I may
proceed to point out particularly for your consideration, the amendments
which ought to be ingrafted into this system, not only in conformity to
my own, but the deliberate opinions of others--you will with me
perceive, that the objections to the plan proposed may, by a more
leisure examination be set in a stronger point of view, especially the
important one, that there is no substantial representation of the people
provided for in a government in which the most essential powers, even as
to the internal police of the country, is proposed to be lodged.

    I think the honest and substantial part of the community will wish
to see this system altered, permanency and consistency given to the
constitution we shall adopt; and therefore they will be anxious to
apportion the powers to the features and organizations of the
government, and to see abuse in the exercise of power more effectually
guarded against.  It is suggested, that state officers, from interested
motives will oppose the constitution presented--I see no reason for
this, their places in general will not be effected, but new openings to
offices and places of profit must evidently be made by the adoption of
the constitution in its present form.

Your's, &c,
THE FEDERAL FARMER.
To the REPUBLICAN.


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